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Is Direct Social Perception a banal thesis? 
A phenomenological response to Spaulding’s 
critique of Direct Social Perception 
 
RESUMÉ 
Direkte Social Perception (DSP) hævder, at vi kan erfare visse mentale tilstande 
hos andre. Spaulding påstår, at de eneste mentale tilstande, som kan blive 
direkte perciperet, er motor-intentioner og aktuelle følelser, og konkluderer 
derfor, at DSP er en banal tese. Jeg argumenter for, (i) at Spaulding ikke 
tilstrækkeligt har demonstreret, at DSP bør begrænses til M-intentioner og 
aktuelle følelser, og at (ii) selv inden for Spauldings begrænsede forståelse kan 
DSP heller ikke karakteriseres som banal. Jeg slår til lyd for, at opfattelsen af 
DSP som banal er en misforståelse af DSP’s sande radikalitet som en del af den 
fænomenologiske fremstilling af social kognition.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Direct Social Perception (DSP) claims that we can directly perceive some 
mental states of others. Spaulding asserts that the only mental states that can 
be directly perceived are motor-intentions and occurrent emotions and 
therefore concludes that DSP is a banal thesis. I argue that (i) Spaulding has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that DSP should be limited to M-intentions and 
occurrent emotions and (ii) that even upon Spaulding’s restricted account, DSP 
cannot be properly deemed banal. I suggest that to view DSP as banal is to 
misunderstand its true radicality as a component of the phenomenological 
account of social cognition.     
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1. Introduction 
The Direct Social Perception Theory (DSP) claims that we can directly perceive 
some mental states of others. DSP is a component of a wider phenomenological 
critique that seeks to challenge traditional accounts of social cognition. One 
such account, which has come under attack from DSP, is Theory-Theory (TT). 
TT claims that we understand others by making inferences about their mental 
states based upon a theory.  
However, some have claimed that DSP is not a radical new approach 
to social cognition but is in fact compatible with TT (e.g. Carruthers 2015; 
Lavelle 2015; Spaulding 2015, in press). Spaulding asserts that the only mental 
states which can be directly perceived are motor-intentions (M-intentions) and 
occurrent emotions. Spaulding suggests that DSP presents such an 
uncontroversial position that even “a modern-day Cartesian could perfectly 
consistently accept this idea” (in press., 20). Spaulding, therefore, concludes 
that DSP is a “banal” thesis (in press., 20) as she sees it as having limited scope 
and because she thinks that it can be incorporated into the very theory that it 
seeks to challenge.  
 Spaulding’s critique appears to leave DSP, and consequently the 
phenomenological approach to social cognition, with bleak prospects. 
However, her critique requires an affirmative answer in response to the two 
following questions: 
i) Are M-intentions and occurrent emotions the only possible candi-
dates for DSP? 
ii) If so, does this mean that DSP is a banal doctrine? 
Pace Spaulding, I will show that to answer (i) in the affirmative one has to adopt 
a form of DSP that is divorced from the phenomenological proposal as a whole, 
and to answer (ii) in the affirmative is to misunderstand the true radicality of 
DSP as a component of the phenomenological account of social cognition.   
 In this article, I will start by briefly introducing the social cognition 
debate (section 2) and setting out a summary of Spaulding’s assessment of DSP 
(section 3). I shall then present two reasons for rejecting Spaulding’s restriction 
of the scope of DSP to M-intentions and occurrent emotions (section 4). The first 
reason being that Spaulding’s scope of DSP is founded upon a definition of 
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inference that she herself has stipulated; as such, she can be accused of begging 
the question. Secondly, I draw on the research of Beccio et al. (2012) to show 
that there is evidence which calls into question Spaulding’s assertion that M-
intentions are the only kind of intentions that we are able to directly perceive. 
I then turn to the question of whether DSP can be rightly deemed a banal 
doctrine (section 5). I suggest that Spaulding’s claim that DSP is banal because 
of its limited scope relies upon interpreting this scope within the traditional 
framework of social cognition that the phenomenological approach challenges. 
In response to Spaulding’s claim that DSP is banal simply because it is 
compatible with TT, I suggest that such a claim fails to recognise the radicality 
of DSP in challenging the way that we approach social cognition and that DSP, 
arguably, has already changed the framework in which the social cognition 
debate takes place. 
2. The social cognition debate 
The social cognition debate1 is concerned with the question of how it is that we 
understand other people. When we interact we do not approach the other as an 
inanimate object but as another subject with thoughts, emotions and beliefs. 
Social cognition seeks to explain how this social understanding and interaction 
comes about.  
Traditionally, TT has featured as a major contender in the social 
cognition debate. According to TT, in order to attribute mental states to others 
we use a theory about the relationship between mental states, behaviour and 
the environment. Such a theory involves law-like generalisations from which 
we can infer mental states based upon our observation of the other’s behaviour 
                                                 
1 Questions about how we understand the mental states of others have traditionally been 
labelled as taking place within the ‘Theory of Mind’ debate. However, this phrase has been 
closely associated with a particular brand of Theory of Mind, namely TT. This has led some 
to adopt phraseology such as ‘mindreading’, ‘mentalising’ or ‘social cognition’, which they 
consider to be more neutral. In my view, ‘mindreading’ and ‘mentalising’ are still loaded 
terms as they contain an implicit assumption that understanding the mental states of others 
relies on our ability to gain or infer access to the internal, hidden mind of the other. As this 
is a premise that DSP wishes to challenge, I favour the term ‘social cognition’ and will use 
this in an attempt to set a more neutral framework for the discussion.  
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and environment (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman 1992; Segal 1996). While the theory 
can be applied to others explicitly (at the personal level), many proponents of 
TT claim that these inferences take place implicitly (at the sub-personal level).  
Although addressing how we understand others from a 
phenomenological perspective is not a new approach, there has been a recent 
upsurge in phenomenological contributions to the social cognition debate (e.g. 
De Jaeger 2009; Gallagher 2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2015; León 2013; Ratcliffe 2007; 
Taipale 2015; Zahavi 2011, 2015). A central idea of these phenomenological 
contributions is that we are able to perceive some mental states directly and 
non-inferentially. To support this claim, an appeal is made to our everyday 
experiences of how we understand others. For instance, when I see someone’s 
face contorted in anger it seems that I really am perceiving his anger; the bodily 
expression of anger is not just a clue for recognising the presence of another’s 
anger but is itself part of that person’s anger.  
According to DSP, as we can directly perceive some mental states, in 
most face-to-face social situations we do not rely on a theory to understand 
others. Note should be taken of the word ‘most’. It is recognised that sometimes 
others appear to be an enigma to us. It should also be emphasised that this 
article is focused upon social perception in face-to-face scenarios. With the 
advances in communicative technology, we increasingly interact with one 
another from a distance. In such scenarios it is anticipated that we may use 
other methods to understand people, such as theory or simulation. It is 
therefore important to stress that phenomenological accounts do not claim that 
directly perceiving the mental states of others is explanatorily exhaustive.  
It should be emphasised that DSP is proposed as a component of a 
broader phenomenological approach to social cognition. Therefore, it should 
not be seen as an isolated claim but as embedded in a wider phenomenological 
assessment of social cognition. As Gallagher (2008b) summarises, the 
phenomenological alternative to social cognition challenges three pervasive 
assumptions that underlie TT, namely: 
i) the Cartesian supposition that behaviour is observable but mental 
states are hidden and inaccessible; 
ii) that in social cognition we assume the position of observer rather 
than being embedded in interaction with others; and 
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iii) the notion that TT must lie at the foundation of our understanding of 
others, instead of seeing these as special (and perhaps even rarely 
used) skills. 
To this list, I would suggest explicitly drawing out a fourth assumption that 
phenomenological approaches, such as those espoused by Gallagher (2015) and 
Ratcliffe (2007), also contest: 
iv) that the fundamental way that we understand others is through the 
ascription of propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) to them.   
In light of this, DSP should be considered as a component of a broader 
phenomenological proposal challenging the tradition framework in which we 
think about social cognition.  
3. Spaulding’s critique of DSP 
Spaulding (in press, 2015) has written two recent papers that aim to assess the 
plausibility of DSP and its potential scope in the social cognition debate. She 
claims that DSP is a banal theory: far from being a radical challenge to TT, she 
asserts that it is in fact compatible with it, and limited in its scope. Below I set 
out a summary of her main claims in these papers. 
3.1 The problem of inference 
Spaulding claims that the debate in social cognition about whether any mental 
states can be seen directly and non-inferentially has turned on a mismatch in 
the use of the word inference. Those supporting inferential accounts of 
perceiving mental states (such as TT) use the word inference in a broad sense, 
one that defines inferences as including sub-personal computations. By 
contrast, those in the DSP camp tend to use the word inference in a narrow 
sense, one that defines inferences as being at the personal, conscious level 
(Spaulding 2015, 476). Indeed, Spaulding is not the only one to highlight that 
debates about social cognition often turn on inconsistent uses of the word 
inference (see also: Bohl 2015; Zahavi 2011, 2015).  
 As such, when debating whether mental states can be seen non-
inferentially there is a great risk of TT and DSP proponents talking at cross-
purposes. Based on this conclusion, Spaulding suggests that it would be more 
      /  Lucy Osler   ISSN: 2245-9855 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling Årg. 4, nr. 2 (2016) 
Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication Vol. 4, no. 2 (2016) 
80
fruitful for this debate about direct perception to move away from the “thorny 
issue of what an inference is” (2015, 476). 
3.2 Basic perceptual beliefs  
In order to move away from the ‘thorny issue’ of inference, Spaulding attempts 
to reframe DSP in terms of basic perceptual beliefs (BPBs). Using Lyons’ 
criteria, Spaulding states that in order for a perceptual belief to be a BPB it 
“must be produced by a cognitive system whose operations are automatic, not 
subject to voluntary control, not consciously accessible, and do not take beliefs 
as inputs” (2015, 479). The claim that we can directly perceive mental states can 
now be reformulated in the following way: when I perceive your face contort 
in a particular way I form a BPB based upon my perception which has content 
such as ‘you are happy’, ‘you are angry’, ‘you believe x’ (Spaulding 2015, 477). 
Spaulding sees this as a promising route for DSP as BPBs are deemed to be non-
inferentially justified beliefs (i.e. they do not rely upon inferences from other 
beliefs).  
If some of our perceptual beliefs about mental states qualify as BPBs, 
Spaulding thinks this will allow us to contend that we can perceive certain 
mental states without relying on inferences drawn from beliefs about the 
other’s behaviour or social context. Spaulding claims that this approach 
captures the “spirit of DSP” (2015, 477) as it presents a formulation of mental 
states that are perceptual, non-inferential and immediately accessible.  
3.3. Mental state candidates for DSP 
DSP proponents commonly argue that intentions and emotions are directly 
perceptible (e.g. De Jaeger 2009; Gallagher 2008a; Krueger and Overgaard 2012; 
Zahavi 2011). According to Spaulding, however, the only intentions that are 
plausible candidates for BPBs (and thus for DSP) are M-intentions. M-
intentions are goal-directed movements towards objects in the world. The 
examples of M-intentions that Spaulding gives are of pulling, grasping, 
pushing, opening and closing (2015, 480). The observation of M-intentions 
involves the activation of the mirror neuron system in the observer’s brain 
(Gallese & Goldman 1998). This system operates at the sub-personal level and 
thus is not under the direct, voluntary control of the subject. This suggests that 
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the observation of M-intentions is not inferentially mediated and therefore falls 
under Spaulding’s defined scope of DSP.    
Spaulding dismisses perceptual beliefs about present intentions and 
future intentions as possible candidates for BPBs. This is based upon her claim 
that in order for an observer to form beliefs about another’s present and future 
intentions, the observer must draw upon inferences from additional beliefs that 
they hold about what the other is doing and the social context that the other is 
in. As highlighted below, for Spaulding social context is something that can 
only be incorporated into our understanding of others through inference.  
 Spaulding thinks that beliefs about occurrent emotions can also qualify 
as BPBs.  Occurrent emotions are defined as including affective responses (e.g. 
anger) and moods (e.g. anxiety). Spaulding sees these as good candidates for 
BPBs as they involve distinctive bodily expressions and one formulates the 
belief that one is seeing an occurrent emotion automatically, without conscious 
deliberation. Occurrent emotions are contrasted against dispositional emotions 
(e.g. envy), which are not necessarily accompanied by any distinctive bodily 
expressions, which an observer can perceive. Spaulding dismisses beliefs about 
dispositional emotions as candidates for BPBs on the basis that in order to form 
such beliefs an observer would need to draw inferences from other beliefs 
about the other’s character, history or circumstance.  
 Other sorts of mental states are considered beyond the scope of DSP 
for related reasons. Beliefs, for example, are ruled out entirely for not being 
closely linked to particular behaviours. Spaulding asserts that since it is 
possible to hold a belief without acting upon it, there is nothing observable for 
another to form a BPB about.  
 Spaulding asserts that if the only mental states that can be directly 
perceived are M-intentions and occurrent emotions, this renders DSP a banal 
thesis. Our social cognition abilities go far beyond understanding M-intentions 
and occurrent emotions, so on Spaulding’s account DSP has very limited 
application in the social cognition debate. Moreover, Spaulding accuses DSP of 
banality because she thinks that it does not pose a challenge to TT. In her view, 
TT can accept that M-intentions and occurrent emotions are directly 
perceivable without undermining their own theory of social cognition; the idea 
being that this uncontroversial claim can be accepted while still upholding that 
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social cognition predominantly involves attributing mental states to others 
through the use of a theory of mind (Spaulding in press). The threat is that 
Spaulding shows the scope of DSP, and the phenomenological proposal more 
generally, to be narrow to the point of insignificance; insignificant precisely 
because it asserts a position that is uncontroversial and compatible with the 
very theory it tries to contest.  
 In order to assess Spaulding’s conclusion that DSP is a banal doctrine, 
we must look at the following questions:  
i) Does DSP only apply to M-intentions and occurrent emotions? 
ii) If so, does this mean that DSP is a banal thesis?  
4. Are M-intentions and occurrent emotions the only possible candidates for 
DSP? 
4.1 The problem of inference revisited  
A key motivation for Spaulding reframing DSP in terms of BPBs is to avoid 
defining what an inference is. As we saw, Spaulding identifies a tendency 
amongst many writers in the social cognition debate of simply picking out their 
preferred interpretation of inference and claiming that it is the correct 
interpretation (2015, 476). She claims that this leads to a stalemate in the social 
cognition debate.  
However, Spaulding explicitly states that Lyons’ BPB criteria 
“[determine] when cognition is inferentially mediated” (in press, 23). 
Consequently, anything that falls outside the limited criteria for BPBs is ruled 
out by Spaulding as a candidate for DSP on the basis that it is inferentially 
mediated. Indeed, Spaulding seems to suggest that all complex processes 
involving conscious control or access are necessarily inferential. 
In defining everything outside the narrow scope of BPB as inferentially 
mediated, Spaulding sets out a definition of inference. As she states herself: “to 
stipulate that one [definition of inference] is the appropriate conception would 
be begging the question” (2015, 476). It seems odd, then, that Spaulding sets 
herself up for being accused of question begging when she has anticipated this 
very problem. She has not pivoted away from the problem of inference so much 
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as walked straight back into this ‘thorny issue’. Unsurprisingly, the DSP 
proponent will not simply accept Spaulding’s definition of inference as 
indisputable; particularly as she is coming to the table with a very liberal 
definition. 
 By opting for a broad definition of inference, Spaulding expels all 
reference to social context by DSP. As a result of this expulsion, present 
intentions, future intentions, dispositional emotions and beliefs are eliminated 
from the scope of DSP. In doing this, Spaulding overlooks the fact that DSP is 
not proposed as an alternative to TT on its own but as part of a wider 
phenomenological project (something which Gallagher (2015) claims many 
critics of DSP overlook). As Zahavi points out: “few, if any, phenomenologists 
would deny that the social understanding in question is influenced and 
enriched by background knowledge, contextual clues and past experiences” 
(2011, 547). To try and extract DSP from social context is to miss the very ‘spirit’ 
of the phenomenological approach (which, incidentally, Spaulding claims to be 
upholding).  
Spaulding describes social context as something that must be added to 
direct perception. To use her own example, Spaulding states that when I see 
you grabbing a piece of cake I cannot directly perceive whether your intention 
is to eat the cake or to give it to someone else. She claims that the only way for 
me to reach your present intention is to infer your intention from my beliefs 
about the social context you are in and what you are doing.  
A consequence of deeming social context something that must be 
inferentially added to the situation, is that it gives the impression that social 
understanding happens in snapshot moments, rather than something that 
unfolds over time. The phenomenological approach seeks to challenge this 
seemingly disjointed picture of social cognition. For the phenomenologist, 
social context is not inferentially tacked on to our perception of others. Just as 
when we see an object we see it within the context of our perceptual field, when 
we see other people we do so within a specific situation. That this might be 
neurologically complex does not necessarily make it inferential. Perceiving 
objects involves complex neurological processes but we do not say we perceive 
objects inferentially. Therefore, saying that perception of social context is 
complex, as Spaulding implies, is not sufficient for concluding that it must be 
inferential (Zahavi 2011). While Spaulding criticises this move for only 
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amounting to a negative definition of inference, it certainly raises questions 
about whether Spaulding’s very broad definition of inference is justified.  
The reason that the phenomenological approach emphasises the role of 
social context as enriching our direct perception is to reflect our experience that 
people do not appear to us in a vacuum. For example, if I see you reaching out 
to grab a cake and I know that you are a waitress, I see your cake-grabbing in 
the meaningful context of you serving food. I do not need to inferentially 
contemplate the social context; the whole scene appears to me as meaningful 
precisely because of the context in which the actions occur.  
It is arguable that even M-intentions only make sense if we recognise 
that they occur in context. I can only see you as grabbing something if there is 
a context in which there is something to grab; the context adds the specification 
of the action (Gallagher 2015). Perceiving M-intentions presupposes that there 
is something to be intentionally directed to. If there is no contextual 
understanding, it is difficult to explain how we can distinguish between a 
meaningful, intentional movement from a random movement (which research 
on M-intentions shows we do (Iocaboni et al. 2005)). If context non-inferentially 
plays a role in directly perceiving M-intentions, this leads one to ask if context 
might be non-inferentially involved in detection of other intentions and 
emotions.  
If Spaulding is not justified in expelling social context from DSP, then 
additional mental states could be brought within the fold of DSP. As set out 
above, by allowing the cake grabbing situation to be informed by social context, 
it can be argued that the present intention of the waitress to serve the cake can 
be directly perceived. Thus it could be argued that the scope of DSP should be 
expanded to include, at the very least, some present intentions.  
This stress upon social interaction and understanding being embedded 
in a wider context is at the heart of the phenomenological approach to social 
cognition. It opposes the descriptions found in traditional social cognition 
theories of social experience as something that is coldly observed on a moment-
by-moment basis. In trying to demonstrate that DSP is compatible with TT by 
extracting it from social context, Spaulding risks presenting an account of DSP 
that is fundamentally incompatible with the phenomenological conception of 
social cognition. It may be the case that Spaulding is happy to accept that her 
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account is not palatable to phenomenologists. However, as stated above, 
Spaulding will still have to answer the challenge that she is question begging 
by stipulating that everything outside the scope of the BPB criteria is 
intentionally mediated.  
4.2 M-intentions 
There is an additional reason for challenging Spaulding’s construal of DSP as 
limited to M-intentions and occurrent emotions. This challenge is found in 
recent research about visual kinematics. The research of Beccio et al. suggests 
that “[b]y simply observing others’ movements, we might know what they 
have in mind to do” (Beccio et al. 2012, 4). This leads us to ask whether 
Spaulding is justified in asserting that we can only directly perceive M-
intentions and not present intentions.  
Let us consider what Spaulding grants when she claims that we can 
directly perceive M-intentions. When talking of M-intentions, the examples 
Spaulding gives are of grabbing, pushing, pulling, opening and closing. As 
such, the claim that M-intentions are the only intentions that we can directly 
perceive in action gives us a pretty sparse account of the scope of DSP.  
However, research has suggested that the information conveyed by 
perceiving another person’s actions is more far-reaching than Spaulding 
implies. The research of Beccio et al. (2012) provides evidence that our 
movements slightly differ depending on whether we are grabbing something 
in order to eat it, to serve it or to throw it and that we are able to perceive these 
differences. This research shows that we can differentiate between these 
intentions without relying upon contextual clues. This suggests that we can see 
many actions as meaning-laden without needing to appeal to anything beyond 
perception. As such, Beccio et al. claim that “motor information conveyed by 
visual kinematics may provide a direct access to others’ intentions” (2012, 1).  
The interesting implication here is that the line Spaulding draws 
between M-intentions and present intentions is blurred. The threat of 
Spaulding’s account is that directly perceiving M-intentions can tell us the 
‘presence’ of an intentional action but not the ‘why’ of the intentional action 
(e.g. that the other intends to reach for the cake but not why they reach for the 
cake). To get to the ‘why’ of an intentional action Spaulding claims that we 
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must make inferences from other beliefs that we hold and this exceeds her 
defined scope of DSP. However, if it is the case that I can see in someone’s 
movements that they are not just grabbing cake but grabbing cake to serve it, 
this looks like I can see that person’s present intention. As such Beccio et al.’s 
research calls into question the restriction of DSP’s scope to M-intentions by 
Spaulding.  
5.  Is DSP a banal thesis? 
As set out above, there are reasons to doubt Spaulding’s conclusion that DSP 
only applies to M-intentions and occurrent emotions. Consequently, it seems 
that Spaulding’s assertion that DSP is banal is, at least in part, based on an 
unjustified conclusion about the scope of DSP. Nevertheless, it is one thing to 
question Spaulding’s manner of defining the scope of DSP and another to 
present a positive account of what the scope of DSP is. Indeed, it is difficult to 
see how Spaulding’s call for DSP proponents to offer an explanation of how 
social context can be said to form part of our direct perception can be answered 
without another question-begging definition of inference being put forward. 
As such, I shall not attempt to formulate such a positive account here.  
Rather, let us consider where DSP is left if Spaulding were right to 
conclude that the only candidates for DSP are M-intentions and occurrent 
emotions. In my view, the scope of DSP, as delimited by Spaulding, is only 
banal if you interpret this scope within the traditional framework of social 
cognition that the phenomenological approach challenges. What is more, I do 
not think that the potential compatibility of DSP with TT per se renders DSP 
banal. On the contrary, it is my view that the very idea that DSP can be 
considered a banal doctrine shows the impact the DSP thesis has already had 
on the way we currently approach the social cognition debate.  
5.1 DSP in everyday encounters 
Spaulding places stress on the argument that beliefs are not candidates for DSP; 
she sees this as a significant gap in the explanatory force of DSP. Indeed, if 
ascribing beliefs to other people is a prevalent way that we understand others 
in our everyday encounters and DSP cannot account for this, it might not seem 
a far stretch to conclude that DSP has a limited role to play in the social 
cognition debate and consequently be dubbed banal.  
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While some proponents of DSP argue that we can see beliefs (e.g. 
Gallagher & Hutto 2008), many do not. Does this amount to a concession to 
Spaulding’s claim that DSP is banal? This would only be the case if you suppose 
that belief ascription is the most fundamental and common way in which we 
understand others (as this would imply that there are swaths of instances of 
understanding others in which DSP has no application). Yet, in emphasising 
that understanding others arises through interaction, the phenomenological 
approach challenges the supposition that belief ascription is at the heart of how 
we go about understanding people. As such, stating that we cannot directly 
perceive others’ beliefs need not lead us to conclude that DSP is trivial in its 
application.  
In many cases, belief ascription appears to be a detached and 
cognitively onerous way of understanding people. It seems odd to say that 
when I see you grab for a cake that I go through a process of ascribing beliefs 
to you about there being cake, it being edible etc. To use our earlier example, 
the fact that you are a waitress seems to be reason enough for me to understand 
that you intend to grab the cake to serve it. We might re-explain situations in 
terms of belief ascription but this does not seem to capture our situated 
experience of interacting with and understanding others.  
Moreover, if one did need to rely on belief ascription it seems that we 
could get trapped in an infinite task. Ratcliffe summarises this dilemma as 
follows: “Trying to account for any action, whether one’s own or someone 
else’s, in terms of an exhaustive list of beliefs and desires would be a never-
ending and futile task. Every belief listed would presuppose further beliefs. 
These would presuppose yet further beliefs and so forth” (2007, 99). The 
phenomenological approach avoids this problem by rejecting the notion that 
social cognition can only be accounted for in terms of propositional attitudes.  
Additionally, it should be remembered that the claim of DSP is that 
some mental states can be directly perceived. DSP is not proposed as having 
exhaustive explanatory force and anticipates that other methods of 
understanding people (such as using a theory) are used. So, the assertion that 
at least in some circumstances we use a theory to ascribe beliefs to another 
person in order to understand them does not, in itself, refute DSP nor 
automatically render it banal.  
      /  Lucy Osler   ISSN: 2245-9855 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling Årg. 4, nr. 2 (2016) 
Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication Vol. 4, no. 2 (2016) 
88
If we recognise that the phenomenological approach rejects the 
prevalence of ascribing beliefs in social cognition, then perhaps the direct 
perception of M-intentions and occurrent emotions is not such a sparse account 
of how we understand people in everyday encounters.  At the very least, before 
DSP is labelled banal, the assumption that belief ascription is an essential part 
of understanding others should be given fair consideration; to ignore this is to 
interpret DSP within the very framework that it attempts to challenge. 
5.2 Challenging the framework  
Even if we argue that DSP is not banal based upon its scope, Spaulding could 
respond that DSP still does not present a view that amounts to “a radical 
alternative to traditional views that it is meant to challenge” (in press, 25).  
Indeed, part of her argument about the banality of DSP rests on the idea that it 
is compatible with TT. The question to be considered, then, is whether the 
potential compatibility of DSP with TT per se renders DSP banal. 
As Gallagher asserts, the claim that DSP and TT can be compatible at 
all might strike us as a “surprising turn” (2015, 453). Traditional TT accounts 
commonly describe mental states as being inaccessible, unobservable and 
hidden (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman 1992; Leslie 2004). Indeed, the supposed 
unobservability of mental states is often evoked as the motivation for claiming 
that we must employ a theory to understand the mental states of others. If TT 
is committed to the idea that mental states are unobservable, it seems strange 
to claim that TT could be compatible with any form of DSP (even Spaulding’s 
reformulation of it).  
However, in more recent accounts of TT, proponents often do not 
defend a rigid idea of mental states as being essentially unobservable. For 
example, Carruthers (2015) claims that nothing about TT requires that mental 
states are always imperceptible (also see: Bohl 2015; Lavelle 2012, 2015). 
Spaulding’s claim that DSP is banal might be understood if we accept that 
modern theory-theorists are not necessarily opposed to the idea that some 
mental states are directly perceptible. For if DSP only applies to the perception 
of M-intentions and occurrent emotions and TT can accept this limited scope of 
direct perception, Spaulding thinks that DSP simply asserts something that is 
uncontroversial.    
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Nevertheless, it is important to consider how Spaulding seeks to make 
DSP compatible with TT. Her account of DSP is an attempt to delineate when 
it is we can be said to directly perceive the mental states of others. To create a 
DSP that is compatible with TT, Spaulding treats DSP as “merely a 
characterisation of perceptual phenomenology or phenomenal experience” 
(Gallagher 2015, 458); she sees DSP merely as a claim about perceptual 
experience. However, as I have attempted to make clear throughout this paper, 
DSP is not proposed as an alternative to traditional views in isolation but as 
part of a wider phenomenological conception of social cognition.  
Spaulding’s version of DSP reveals an underlying commitment to the 
traditional way of viewing social cognition in the following ways: belief 
ascription is still cast as a principal way that we understand others, social 
context as the situation in which we encounter and understand others is not 
contemplated, the idea that we understand others through cold observation is 
prioritised over the idea that we understand others through active engagement, 
and TT continues to be viewed as the fundamental way in which we ascribe 
mental states to others. Since the phenomenological version of DSP rejects all 
these commitments, Spaulding’s account does not engage with the radicality at 
the heart of the phenomenological approach, which attempts to question the 
presuppositions inherent in the traditional framework of social cognition. Only 
by ignoring this radical element can one conclude that DSP is a banal doctrine 
(whatever its scope).  As such, I suggest that DSP only appears banal in 
Spaulding’s assessment because she reformulates DSP in a banal form.  
However, one might go even further than saying that Spaulding fails 
to demonstrate that DSP is a banal thesis because she fails to do justice to the 
DSP project. One could assert that the very idea that DSP can be seen as making 
a banal claim is evidence of the significant effect that DSP has already had on 
the way that we now frame the social cognition debate. Spaulding’s claim that 
TT need not necessarily deny that some mental states are directly perceptible 
may well be a reasonable one but we should not overlook that this marks a real 
change in the way that TT is formulated. This is an undeniably different 
position to earlier claims that mental states are inherently unobservable. I 
suggest that the intuitively persuasive notion that some mental states are 
directly perceptible, as espoused by DSP, may well be part of what has 
motivated this radical reworking of TT.  It therefore seems disingenuous to 
      /  Lucy Osler   ISSN: 2245-9855 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling Årg. 4, nr. 2 (2016) 
Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication Vol. 4, no. 2 (2016) 
90
claim that DSP is a banal thesis if it has helped re-position the commonly 
accepted view about whether some mental states are directly perceptible.  
What is more, in attempting to incorporate DSP, TT comes face to face 
with questions about what types of mental states might be deemed directly 
perceptible, how frequently mental states are directly perceptible and in what 
situations they are directly perceptible. Such questions are closely linked to the 
assumptions in traditional social cognition, which the phenomenological 
approach seeks to challenge; for example, about whether we understand 
people as observers or as embedded in situations, whether TT is the most 
fundamental and basic way that we understand people, whether we 
understand people by ascribing propositional attitudes to them or within 
interactive context. In trying to incorporate DSP, theory-theorists may well be 
forced to engage with these more radical questions or risk offering up a form 
of DSP that does not do justice to the phenomenological approach (as I claim 
Spaulding does). As Gallagher suggests, perhaps we should see DSP as a 
“Trojan horse” (2009, 547); if TT accepts even a minimal notion of DSP, it seems 
that questions that strike at the heart of how we understand social cognition 
could be unwittingly snuck in by the back door. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have shown that Spaulding’s claim that DSP is a banal thesis 
can be challenged in several ways. First, by questioning her conclusion that the 
scope of DSP is restricted to M-intentions and occurrent emotions. This 
conclusion is founded upon a very liberal definition of inference, one that 
incorporates any reference to social context. To dismiss social context for being 
inferential without addressing notions of how we might be said to be embodied 
and embedded in situations amounts to a failure to engage with the proposals 
made by phenomenological accounts of social cognition. Moreover, using 
Spaulding’s own observations about the tendency of writers to opt for their 
own preferred definition of inference, she can be accused of begging the 
question by picking out her own preferred understanding of inference in 
reformulating DSP in terms of BPBs. In this way she stacks the cards against 
DSP from the outset. What is more, the research of Beccio et al. (2012) suggests 
that present intentions, as well as M-intentions, are directly perceptible in the 
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actions of other people. This provides additional cause for questioning whether 
DSP is limited in the way that Spaulding claims.  
An alternative response to Spaulding does not involve rejecting her 
delineated scope of DSP but considering if such a scope would render DSP 
banal. As emphasised throughout this paper, DSP forms a component of a 
wider phenomenological approach to social cognition; an approach that 
challenges the framework of the debate. Considered from the 
phenomenological perspective of social cognition even Spaulding’s restricted 
DSP is not banal. For if belief ascription is rejected as the dominant way that 
we understand others, the prevalence of DSP within day to day interactions 
comes to the fore. Spaulding may well reject this view of propositional attitude 
ascription. However, to deny DSP (and the phenomenological approach more 
generally) its radicality one must engage directly with the challenges that 
phenomenology poses to the traditional framework of social cognition. 
Spaulding has yet to do so.  
Finally, I explored the idea that Spaulding might claim DSP is banal 
purely on the grounds that it is compatible with TT. In response to this 
accusation of banality, I suggested that Spaulding’s own reformulation of DSP 
does not do justice to the radicality of the phenomenological approach; that 
DSP only appears banal to Spaulding because she interprets it in a banal 
manner. I have also claimed that the very idea that directly perceiving some 
mental states of others could be seen as uncontroversial betrays the radical 
impact that DSP has already had on the way in which we approach social 
cognition. This marks a significant shift in the debate about how we understand 
others and this should not be overlooked.    
This does not mean that Spaulding’s account is without merit. She 
effectively raises a number of questions challenging proponents of DSP to more 
exactly account for how we directly perceive mental states, delimit the scope of 
this and explain how it is social context enriches our perception. These are valid 
questions, which many claim have not been adequately addressed (e.g. Bohl 
2015). However, I suggest that Spaulding’s own attempt to answer these 
questions is unsatisfactory as it fails to do justice to the radicality of the 
phenomenological proposal. 
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